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Depersonalization is an essential step in the development of the Cotard delusion.
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1 Introduction
In  Le Délire de Négation (1897),  Jules Séglas
considers  depersonalization  to  be  an  essential
step in the development of the Cotard delusion1
1 According to Berrios & Luque (1995), the English translation of “le
délire des negations”—a term first introduced by the French neurolo-
gist,  Jules  Cotard  (1840–1889)—only  conveys  a  part  of  what  it
means: “Délire is  not a state of  delirium or organic confusion (in
French, délire aigu and confusion mentale) or a delusion (in French,
idée or  thème délirante)—it is more like a syndrome that may in-
(CD; as cited in Debruyne 2009; Gerrans 2002),
and prima facie the two states share a number
of  characteristics:  Patients  suffering  from  the
former feel as if they are dead or do not exist,
clude  symptoms  from  the  intellectual,  emotional,  or  volitional
spheres” (p. 219). The original French concept of “délire” fits better
with Gerrans’ account of the Cotard delusion, in which the Cotard
delusion does not merely concern beliefs of denial, but also anomal-
ous affective processing.
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whereas those who suffer  from the latter  sin-
cerely believe and experience this state.  How-
ever,  the  central  characteristics  of  these  dis-
orders are distinct. Patients describe the experi-
ence of depersonalization as follows:
It’s really weird. It’s sort of like I’m here,
but I’m really not here and that I kind of
stepped out of myself, like a ghost... I feel
really light, you know. I feel kind of empty
and light,  like I’m going to float  away...
Sometimes  I  really  look  at  myself  that
way... It’s kind of a cold eerie feeling. I’m
just totally numbed by it. (Cited in Stein-
berg 1995) 
The emotional part of my brain is dead.
My  feelings  are  peculiar,  I  feel  dead.
Whereas things worried me nothing does
now. My husband is there but he is part of
the furniture. I don’t feel I can worry. All
my emotions are blunted. (Shorvon 1946,
p. 783) 
As illustrated in these subjective descriptions,
depersonalization is  characterized by a loss  of
the sense of presence (Critchley 2005) or an in-
creased  “sense  of  detachment”—the  “[e]xperi-
ence of unreality, detachment, or being an out-
side  observer  with  respect  to  one’s  thoughts,
feelings, sensations, body, or actions” (American
Psychiatric Association 2013,  p.  302).  On the
other hand, in the Cotard delusion (CD), men-
tal  autobiographies  are  acutely  distorted—in
such  a  way  that  patients  are  convinced  that
they are dead or that they do not exist:
An  88-year-old  man  with  mild  cognitive
impairment was admitted to our hospital
for treatment of a severe depressive epis-
ode. He was convinced that he was dead
and felt very anxious because he was not
yet buried. This delusion caused extreme
suffering  and made  outpatient  treatment
impossible. (Debruyne et al. 2009, p. 197) 
Researchers in the field of delusion studies have
debated the way in which anomalous experience
leads to false belief. In this commentary I am
interested in the following questions: What cog-
nitive  architecture  could,  in  principle,  explain
CD in terms of its development from deperson-
alization, and what exactly are the underlying
differences between patients suffering from the
Cotard delusion and those suffering from deper-
sonalization disorder (DPD) but free from the
Cotard delusion? 
In his target paper,  Gerrans explores the
cognitive  structure  of  self-awareness—the
“awareness of being a unified persisting entity”
(this collection, p. 2). To explain the emergence
of self-awareness and its loss in DPD and CD,
he provides an account that integrates the ap-
praisal theory of emotion, the simulation model
of memory and prospection, and the hierarch-
ical predictive coding model. First, based on the
appraisal theory, Gerrans shows that the activa-
tion of the anterior insular cortex (AIC) allows
an organism to experience the emotional signi-
ficance of a relevant state by experiencing ap-
praisal.  According  to  Gerrans,  these  reflexive
processes are what sustain the self from moment
to moment: “An organism that can use that af-
fective information in the process is a self” (this
collection, p. 8). Second, the integration of af-
fective processing and simulated episodes allows
the organism to experience itself as a persisting
entity overtime (see more below). Last, he en-
dorses the predictive coding framework, accord-
ing to which the human mind can be accounted
for by the principle of predictive error minimiz-
ation. Perception, for instance, is realized by the
operation of both top-down prediction and bot-
tom-up predictive error. If the general theoret-
ical model is correct, it will not only apply to
perception,  but  also  to  affective  processing
(ibid.,  p.  9).  Gerrans (this  collection)  applies
this  framework to explain the phenomenon of
depersonalization  and  CD:  Depersonalization
occurs due to a failure to attribute emotional
relevance  to  bodily  states,  which  results  from
hypoactivity of  the AIC. The prediction error
from the mismatch between the predicted and
the  actual  activation  level  of  the  AIC  would
lead to allocation of attention, the function of
which, according to the predictive coding frame-
work, is to disambiguate signals. If the predic-
tion  error  cannot  be  cancelled  and  attention
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cannot be diverted,  increased attention brings
about anxiety in DPD and CD, which is “an ad-
aptive  mechanism  that  primes  the  organism
cognitively  and physiologically to solve  uncer-
tainty” (ibid., p. 11). This is reflected in the pa-
tients’ subjective reports concerning the loss of
awareness of their bodies. This integrated the-
ory provides an explanation of depersonalization
as well as of how self-awareness is constructed
through  the  interaction  of  different  forms  of
cognitive processing.
In Gerrans’ account, the simulation system
allows the organism “to simulate temporally dis-
tant experiences by rehearsing some of the same
perceptual and emotional mechanisms activated
by the simulated situation” (ibid., p. 6), such
that  the  affective  associations  result  in  integ-
rated  episodes  of  experience  that  lead  to  the
feeling of persisting over time. I argue (1) that
the simulation model should not be thought of
as  independent  from  other  memory  systems:
without  memory  systems  at  lower  levels—se-
mantic  and  procedural  memory  systems—the
simulated episodes cannot be constructed (sec-
tion 2); and (2), that by considering the role of
memory under the predictive coding framework,
the simulation model not only plays a role in
simulating temporally-distant episodes but also
contributes  to the knowledge required  for  the
creation  of  predictive  models  in  the  present
(section  3). On such a view of the simulation
model, delusion can be explained and I will sug-
gest (3) two factors contributing to the develop-
ment of  CD from depersonalization:  the com-
promised  decontextualized  supervision  system
and the expectation of high precision from in-
teroceptive signals (section  4); that is,  only if
these two factors are present in a depersonalized
subject may CD develop. 
2 The simulation model and the mental 
autobiography
[W]e  are all  virtuoso novelists,  who find
ourselves engaged in all sorts of behavior,
more or less unified, but sometimes disuni-
fied, and we always put the best ‘faces’ on
it we can. We try to make all of our ma-
terial cohere into a single good story. And
that story is our autobiography. (Dennett
1992, p. 114) 
As persons,  our beliefs  and desires  are struc-
tured in a more or less coherent fashion, such
that a mental autobiography—an autobiograph-
ical  framework  (Gerrans 2013)  or  narrative
(Schechtman 1996)—can  be  attributed,  which
can  explain  our  cognitive  structure.  Many
people  have  proposed  theoretical  entities  such
as the “autobiographical  self”  (Damasio 1999,
2010),  the  “conceptual  self”  (Conway 2005;
Conway et  al. 2004),  and the “narrative self”
(Feinberg 2009),  etc.  to  account  for  how one
comprehends and navigates through the world
and over time—that is, how one is able to make
sense  of  external  or  internal  signals,  to  have
preferences,  to  have  goals  and  to  values,  to
know who oneself is, to be a diachronically per-
sisting agent, to recall the past, and to imagine
the future. In general, these different versions of
the “extended self” (Gallagher 2000) are charac-
terized  by the  following phenomenal  and epi-
stemic properties. 
First,  phenomenally,  we  experience
ourselves  as  thinkers  of  thoughts  (e.g.,  “I
think…” or “I believe…”) and as beings who re-
collect the past and plan for the future; while at
the same time we have a sense of ownership of
relevant  beliefs  (e.g.,  “this  thought  is  mine”).
Second,  subjectively,  events  and  objects  are
presented in a way that manifests their relevance
to  the  subject.  In  addition,  epistemically,  we
tend  to  treat  the  self-told  story  as  if  it  were
highly reliable: The content is treated as object-
ively real,  and its truthfulness is  seldom ques-
tioned. This is the way we consciously compre-
hend the world and our place within it, and it is
thought to be reliable. Accompanied by a certain
degree  of  the  “feeling  of  familiarity”  and  the
“sense of pastness” (Russell 2009, p. 208), there
is a degree of certainty about the veridicality of a
mental  autobiography.  When  inconsistency  or
non-veridicality is detected and such certainty is
lost (e.g., due to introspection or contradiction
to  external  information),  the  mental  autobio-
graphy will be modified to re-create a new sub-
jective reality—a new story about ourselves with
more or less difference (e.g., self-deception). 
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Delusional patients have anomalous forms
of mental autobiography: Their mental autobio-
graphies  are  radically  distorted,  for  different
reasons. For instance, RZ, a 40-year-old female
patient  with  reverse  intermetamorphosis,  be-
lieved that she was her father (and sometimes
believed that she was her grandfather) during
her  assessment by  Breen et  al. (2000).  When
asked to sign her name and answer questions
about her life, she signed her father’s name and
provided her father’s personal history. She acted
according to her delusional beliefs. Here we see
that  her  mental  autobiography constructs  her
subjective  reality.  Semantic  dementia  patients
who suffer from an incapability of constructing
personal futures (Irish &  Piguet 2013) provide
examples of the loss of partial subjective real-
ity.2 It is speculated that this form of futureless
mental  autobiography accounts  for  the  higher
suicide rate in semantic dementia (Hsiao et al.
2013).  As we will  see,  patients  suffering from
CD  also  maintain  a  mental  autobiography.3
They believe that they are dead or no longer
exist: They may refuse to eat or visit the grave-
yard—the place in which they believe they be-
long. But how are mental autobiographies con-
structed? The rest of this section considers how
memory systems and simulation models lead to
the construction of a mental autobiography.
Studies  on misrepresentations in memory
have  suggested  that—against  the  traditional
and  folk-psychological  idea  of  a  “store-house”
(Locke 2008),  in  which memory as  a  copy of
past  experience  is  stored  for  future  use—
memory is constructive in nature. It represents
different facets of experience, which are distrib-
uted across different regions of the brain, where
retrieval is realized in a process of pattern com-
pletion,  which  allows  a  subset  of  features  to
comprise  a  past  experience  (Schacter et  al.
1998). The prevalence of misremembering (epis-
odic memory in particular) and the view of con-
2 If the predictive coding framework and the role of memory for which
I argued in section 3 is correct, one should expect to find an anomal-
ous  phenomenon in semantic  dementia—not  only  with respect  to
one’s narrative consciousness, but also with respect to one’s percep-
tion. 
3 It might be a contradiction in terms to claim that patients suffering
from the Cotard delusion have mental autobiographies, since “auto”
means “self, one’s own” and “bio” means “life”. Here, it can merely
be understood as a personal-level response to the system’s condition.
structive memory have led to the debate over
the function of memory: If the proper function
of memory is to veridically represent past exper-
iences or events, is our memory system funda-
mentally defective? Or, does it serve other func-
tions?  If  there  is  any  adaptive  advantage  of
memory  systems,  they  must  serve  a  function
that concerns the  current and/or future states
of  the  organism (Westbury &  Dennett 2000).
New findings regarding a default-mode network
suggest a “constructive episodic simulation hy-
pothesis” (Schacter & Addis 2007a, 2007b), ac-
cording  to  which  the  constructive  nature  of
episodic memory is partially attributable to its
proposed role  in  mentally simulating our per-
sonal  futures  (e.g.,  planning  a  future  event).
This hypothesis is supported by fMRI evidence
showing that remembering the past as well as
imagining  the  possible  past  and  future  share
correlates  with  the  activities  of  the  default
mode network (Addis et al. 2007; De Brigard et
al. 2013;  Szpunar et al. 2007). Therefore, it is
suggested that episodic memory is adaptive in
that it allows us to employ past experiences in
such a way as to enable simulations of possible
future episodes. 
However,  simulation  is  not  realized  by
episodic  memory  alone.  Though  memory  sys-
tems  (i.e.,  procedural,  semantic,  and  episodic
memory)  can  be  conceptually  distinguished,
they are considered parts of a “monohierarchical
multimemory  systems  model”  (Tulving 1985):
Semantic memory is a specialized subsystem of
procedural memory that lies at the lowest level
of the hierarchy, and semantic memory in turn
contains episodic memory as its specialized sub-
system. The subsystems at higher levels are de-
pendent  on  and  supported  by  those  at  lower
levels.  That  is,  our  everyday autobiographical
memory  is  realized  by  multiple  memory  sys-
tems.  For instance,  a  recent  study has shown
the importance of semantic memory in the con-
struction  of  autobiographical  memory:  While
episodic  memory provides  episodic  details,  se-
mantic memory acts as a schema for integrating
them (Irish & Piguet 2013). That is, our mental
autobiographies  are  constructed  by  the  inter-
play  of  multiple  memory  systems  (e.g.,
Tulving’s SPI model, see Tulving 1995).
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This applies to prospection as well. Differ-
ent categorizations of prospection are proposed
(e.g.,  Atance &  O’Neill 2001;  Szpunar et  al.
2014). In this commentary, I adopt a distinction
offered by  Suddendorf & Corballis (2007), who
distinguish  procedural,  semantic,  and  episodic
prospection  (p.  301,  Figure  1).  Suddendorf &
Corballis (2007) suggest that the function of the
memory and anticipatory systems is to provide
behavioral flexibility; and they also examine the
phylogenetic  development  of  different  memory
systems. According to their model, the flexibil-
ity of anticipatory behavior supported by differ-
ent memory systems can offer varies in degree.
From  the  primitive  form,  procedural  memory
enables stimulus-driven predictions of regularit-
ies and allows behavior to be modulated by ex-
perience,  such  that  the  resulting  behavior  is
stimulus-bound.  Declarative  memory  provides
more flexibility because it can not only be re-
trieved involuntarily, but can also be voluntarily
triggered top-down from the frontal lobe, which
enables decoupled representations that are not
directly tied to the perceptual system. That is,
even though we are still tied to the present in
that  we recall  and imagine  the  future  at  the
present moment, the content of representation
can extend beyond the current immediate envir-
onment.  Specifically,  semantic memory is con-
sidered more primitive than episodic memory as
it  has less scope for flexibility (Suddendorf &
Corballis 2007).4 The former, in allowing learn-
ing in one context to be voluntarily transferred
to  another,  provides  the  basis  for  reasoning.
However, this is about regularities and not par-
ticularities.  Episodic memory supplements this
weakness: A scenario can be simulated and pre-
experienced. Through mental reconstruction or
memory construction, episodic memory not only
recreates past events, it also allows the learned
4 Tulving (2005) and Suddendorf & Corballis (2007) argue that epis-
odic memory emerges later in the course of evolution and belongs
uniquely to human beings. Even if there is evidence suggesting the
existence  of  episodic-like  memory—memory  encoding  “what”,
“where”,  and  “when”  information—in  non-human  creatures  (e.g.,
Western  scrub  jays;  Clayton 2003;  Clayton &  Dickinson 1998),
Tulving (2005)  argues  that  these  phenomena  can  be  explained
merely  by  semantic  memory.  In  a  recent  paper,  Corballis (2013)
changes  the  claim he  makes  in  the  earlier  article  (Suddendorf &
Corballis 2007) and argues that mental time travel also exists in rats,
and that the difference between this and human mental time travel is
simply the degree of complexity.
elements to be incorporated and arranged in a
particular way in order to simulate possible fu-
tures. It thereby provides greater flexibility in
novel situations and provides for the possibility
of making long-term plans, extending even bey-
ond the life-span of the individual. 
To sum up, our mental autobiography is
constructed through the interaction of multiple
memory systems at different levels. The simula-
tion model should not only be associated with
the episodic memory system; rather, it should
be understood as a hierarchical model of mul-
tiple  memory  systems—i.e.,  procedural,  se-
mantic, and episodic memory as well as proced-
ural, semantic, and episodic prospection. In the
next section I will consider the role of memory
systems within the predictive coding framework.
3 Memory under the predictive coding 
framework
Recent  development  of  the  predictive  coding
framework (Clark 2013b, this collection; Friston
2003;  Hohwy this collection) provides an integ-
rated conceptual framework for perception and
action. According to the framework, the brain
constantly  attempts  to  minimize  the  discrep-
ancy between sensory inputs (including extero-
ceptive  and interoceptive  signals)  and  the  in-
ternal models of the causes of those inputs via
reciprocal  interactions  between  hierarchical
levels. Each cortical level employs a generative
model to predict representations of the subor-
dinate level, to which the prediction is sent via
top-down projections—the bottom-up signal is
the prediction error. Prediction error minimiza-
tion  can  be  achieved  in  a  number  of  ways
(Clark this  collection;  Hohwy this  collection);
but in general, errors can be minimized either
by updating generative models to fit the input
or by carrying out actions to change the world
to fit the model. In the target paper,  Gerrans
integrates appraisal processing into the predict-
ive coding framework; however, he treats only
the simulation model as a mechanism for simu-
lating temporally distant experiences (this col-
lection, pp. 6–8). In this section, I propose that
under the predictive coding framework, the sim-
ulation model serves the function of  updating
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the knowledge required for successful prediction,
which constitutes  perception and affective  ex-
perience.
How  can  we  understand  the  role  of
memory  or  the  simulation  system  under  the
predictive coding framework?5 Here I  examine
how memory systems can be incorporated into
the framework. According to the predictive cod-
ing framework, perceiving is distinct from the
traditional model of perception; instead, it is:
to use whatever stored knowledge is avail-
able to guide a set of guesses about […ex-
ternal causes], and then to compare those
guesses to the incoming signal, using resid-
ual  errors  to  decide  between  competing
guesses  and  (where  necessary)  to  reject
one set of guesses and replace it with an-
other. (Clark 2013a, p. 743) 
That  is,  perception  is  knowledge-driven  and
top-down, rather than stimulus-driven and bot-
tom-up. “Stored knowledge” refers to a reper-
toire of prior beliefs or knowledge—the belief of
the likelihood of a hypothesis or guess irrespect-
ive of sensory input. It is acquired or shaped by
learning  from  past  experience—or,  in  other
words, it is a modification of parameters in or-
der to minimize prediction error.6 
Moshe Bar (2009) suggests that “our per-
ception of the environment relies on memory as
much as it does on incoming information” (p.
1235).  Since  we  seldom  encounter  completely
novel objects or events, our systems rely on rep-
resentations stored in memory systems to gener-
ate predictions. According to Bar’s “analogy-as-
sociation-prediction”  framework  (Bar &  Neta
2008), once there is a sensory input, the brain
actively generates top-down guesses in order to
figure out what that input looks like (analogy);
the match triggers activation of associated rep-
5 Felipe De Brigard (2012) considers how the predictive coding frame-
work  can  predict  remembering.  He  modifies  Anderson’s  Adaptive
Control  of  Thought-Rational  model  (Anderson &  Schooler 2000);
here the probability of a memory retrieval can be calculated based
on how well memory retrieval will minimize prediction error given
the cost of the retrieval and the current context. Here, however, I
shall not consider the retrieval of individual memories; instead I fo-
cus on the role of the memory systems within the framework.
6 See Clark (2013a) for the problem of the acquisition of the very first
prior knowledge.
resentations (association), which allows predic-
tions of what is likely to happen in the relevant
context and environment (prediction). Thus, in-
stead of aiming to answer the question “what is
this?”,  perception  studies  should  answer  the
question “what is this like?” or “what does this
resemble?”: Brains proactively compare incom-
ing signals with existing information gained in
the past (see  Bar 2009, Figure 1 & Figure 2).
Bar (2009) suggests that predictions also influ-
ence  memory  encoding.  Memory  systems
primarily  encode  that  which  differs  from
memory-based prediction, and if sensory inform-
ation meets the prediction,  the information is
less likely to encode (Bar 2009, p. 1240). 
This account provides a new view of the
concepts of encoding, retrieval, and reconsolida-
tion. The older view describes encoding as the
process by which incoming information is stored
for later retrieval, and retrieval as a process in-
volved in utilizing encoded information in reviv-
ing past events. Nevertheless, under the predict-
ive  coding  framework,  when  discrepancy
between prediction and perceptual information
occurs,  encoding  is  the  process  of  minimizing
prediction error—the adaptation of  the model
to  reduce  discrepancy  based  on  the  forward-
feeding, bottom-up input from its subordinate
level. Retrieval is then regarded as the process
of utilizing this knowledge for predictive model
construction.
Accordingly,  I  suggest  that  the  role  of
memory systems is to update the knowledge re-
quired for successful predictions of  the organ-
ism’s current (and future) informational state.
That is, under the predictive coding framework,
our perception is knowledge-driven, and know-
ledge  is  experience-based.  The  mechanisms  of
our  memory  systems  allow  the  knowledge  re-
quired for the construction of predictive models
to be updated based on experience. Prediction
error  can  trigger  encoding  that  modifies  our
knowledge, which then optimizes the predictive
model to achieve prediction error minimization.
In addition, as we will see later in this section,
the development of episodic memory and mind-
wandering allows us to generate new knowledge.
This knowledge-driven perception is real-
ized by a multi-layer  hierarchical  structure in
Lin, Y. T. (2015). Memory for Prediction Error Minimization: From Depersonalization to the Delusion of Non-Existence - A Commentary
on Philip Gerrans. In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 15(C). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570719 6 | 13
www.open-mind.net
which “each layer is trying to build knowledge
structures  that  will  enable  it  to  generate  the
patterns of  activity occurring at the level be-
low” (Clark 2013a, p. 483). The information en-
coded at each level is distinct: At higher hier-
archical levels, the representations become more
abstract and involve a larger spatial and tem-
poral dimension: The predictive models gener-
ated not only represent the immediate state of
the system or environment but also the system
in relation to the spatially and temporally-ex-
tended environment. Moreover, the higher-level
knowledge also supports predicting how sensory
signals will change and evolve over time. It al-
lows one to predict the future and execute long-
term plans involving multiple steps. The hier-
archical structure is crucial to our capacity to
comprehend the  world,  which  is  highly  struc-
tured, with regularity and patterns at multiple
spatial and temporal scales and interacting and
complexly-nested causes (Clark 2013a).
I suggest that each level of knowledge has
an  updating  mechanism,  which  is  consistent
with  Tulving’s  (1985)  monohierarchical  mul-
timemory  systems  model  and  Suddendorf &
Corballis’ (2007) model of memory and prospec-
tion. Procedural memory at the lowest level is
involved  in  the  sensori-motor  predictive  func-
tion:  It  updates the procedural  knowledge re-
quired for predicting the states in which given
actions are executed. Whereas implicit memory
is  mainly  involved  in  immediate  responses  to
current stimuli, declarative or explicit memory
(episodic memory in particular) contributes to
the construction of a model of the system itself
and its environment with spatial and temporal
dimensions.  It  supplements  higher-level  know-
ledge structures for the construction of a gener-
ative model,  which explains actual states  and
predicts possible changes and actions for reach-
ing desired states. Under the predictive coding
framework, the semantic memory system, which
allows learning in one context to be transferred
to another, supports semantic knowledge, which
in turn provides regularities in the construction
of predictive models (e.g., during reading). And
episodic  memory,  together  with  semantic
memory,  supports  the  knowledge  required  to
construct  a  model  of  one’s  autobiography—a
model of one’s own relevant past and potential
future.  However,  it  is  worth  noting  that  our
mental autobiography is not realized by know-
ledge at a single hierarchical level; instead, it is
constructed through the interplay of the mech-
anisms at multiple levels.
In addition to its contribution to an auto-
biographical-scale  model,  episodic  memory,
along with other memory systems, also gener-
ates new knowledge by simulation.  Bar (2007)
proposes that: 
[the] primary role [of mental time travel] is
to  create  new  ‘memories’.  We  simulate,
plan and combine past and future in our
thoughts, and the result might be ‘written’
in memory for future use. These simulated
memories are different from real memories
in that they have not happened in reality,
but  both  real  and  simulated  memories
could  be  helpful  later  in  the  future  by
providing  approximated  scripts  for
thought and action. (p. 286)
This is supported by the evidence that mind-
wandering—that  is,  having  thoughts  that  are
unrelated  to  the  current  demands  of  the  ex-
ternal  environment  (Schooler et  al. 2011)—is
beneficial to autobiographical planning and cre-
ative problem solving (Mooneyham & Schooler
2013).7
The  role  of  memory  systems  under  the
hierarchical predictive coding framework is con-
sistent  with  the  function  of  memory  and the
concept of  a  memory system proposed by  De
Brigard (2013). Following Carl F. Craver’s idea
of  a  mechanistic  role  function  (2001),  De
Brigard argues for a larger cognitive system of
“episodic hypothetical thinking”, which includes
7 This is related to the philosophical debate on whether one can gain new
knowledge from imagination or a purely mental activity, as was famously
denied by Sartre (1972) and Wittgenstein (1980) (for a general discus-
sion, see  Stock 2007). It is worth noting that if the predictive coding
framework is correct, the concept of “knowledge” may be revised: Know-
ledge may depart from veridicality; instead, it is close to information that
can provide successful predictions. Thus, under the predictive coding
framework, the only kind of knowledge Sartre recognizes (as cited in
Stock 2007, p. 176)—observational knowledge—is not substantially dif-
ferent from other kinds of knowledge, because the knowledge gained
through perception cannot be conceptually distinguished from those that
are not: Gaining knowledge at each level is all about optimizing the pre-
dictions of lower levels.
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future simulation and past counterfactual simu-
lations: To determine the mechanistic function
of memory we require an investigation into the
way that its components contribute to the sys-
tem, and then of  how memory contributes  to
the functioning of  the organism, helping it to
reach goals at higher levels. It is worth noting
that  these  concepts  of  memory  function  and
malfunction  are  different  to  traditional  ones:
The distinction between memory function and
malfunction is not equivalent to the distinction
between  remembering  and misremembering  or
veridical  representation  and misrepresentation.
Under  the  predictive  coding  framework,
memory function can be regarded as updating
knowledge  for  predictive  model  construction.
Likewise, memory function and malfunction are
independent from the generation of a predictive
model that succeeds or fails in representing the
world.  That is,  certain misrepresentations  can
lead  to  error  minimization;  furthermore,  it  is
possible  for  misrepresentation  rather  than
veridical representation to lead to a generative
model. 
4 From depersonalization to Cotard 
delusion
If the predictive coding framework is correct, it
provides a new view not only on memory func-
tion but also on how we think about memory
systems and the relation between memory and
other  cognitive  systems.  This  framework
provides a theory about the role of simulation
models  in  the  relationship  between  reflexive
forms of self-consciousness and the narrative self
(Hohwy 2007). It provides a theoretical explana-
tion  of  the  finding  that  memory  systems  are
also involved in perception8 and interoception.
This implies that we not only simulate offline
(e.g., mental time travel, mind-wandering), but
also  simulate  online.  The  simulated  model
provides  us  with  a  subjective  reality  through
which we see the external world and ourselves.
It is transparent and immediate: We experience
it  as  objectively  real  and we directly interact
with what is represented. 
8 This is consistent with the evidence that memory influences percep-
tion (e.g., Summerfield et al. 2011).
However,  this  characteristic  is  absent  in
patients  suffering  from  depersonalization.  De-
personalization is an example of how one can
become detached from one’s simulated model of
oneself:  One’s  mental  autobiography  is  no
longer  direct,  and  one  experiences  a  sense  of
distance from the model.9 Gerrans (this collec-
tion) suggests that the loss of sense of presence
in depersonalized patients results from a failure
to  minimize  prediction  error  from  the  hypo-
activity of the AIC—the activation of which in-
forms us of the significance of  external or in-
ternal information. Gerrans’ theory is based on
Seth et al.’s idea of interoceptive inference (or
interoceptive  predictive  coding;  see  also  Seth
this  collection),  according  to  which  predictive
coding  not  only  applies  to  exteroception  but
also to interoception, and emotional states, in-
cluding the sense of presence, arise from intero-
ceptive  prediction  successfully  matched to  ac-
tual interoceptive signals (Seth 2013; Seth et al.
2011). As it is suggested that the AIC is sugges-
ted to be the correlate of the integration of ex-
teroceptive and interoceptive signals and that it
plays a role in maintaining a salience network
for the relevant states, the hypoactivity of the
AIC leads to the failure to associate affective
significance with bodily states. As Gerrans sug-
gests, “not all higher level control systems can
and do smoothly cancel prediction errors gener-
ated at lower levels” (this collection, p. 9). Be-
cause the coding formats at each level are dis-
tinct, the coding format of low-level processing
is opaque to introspection (p. 9). The problems
faced by depersonalized patients can be accoun-
ted for by the prediction error based on persist-
ing, unexpected hypoactivity. Attention is then
directed towards resolving the prediction error.
Gerrans’ proposal is that an inability to explain
away the surprisal and this increased attention
causes anxiety in DPD. Here, CD can be seen
as a strategy for some systems to react to anxi-
ety in order to minimize the prediction error.
As  Gerrans suggests, “[d]elusions are best
conceptualized as higher-level responses to pre-
9 In  contrast  to  depersonalization,  derealization  refers  to  the
“[e]xperiences  of  unreality  of  detachment  with  respect  to  sur-
roundings” (American Psychiatric Association 2013, p. 302)—pa-
tients  suffer from detachment  from the simulated model  of  the
environment.
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diction  error  which,  however,  cannot  cancel
those errors”  (this  collection,  p.  10).  That is,
even though not all prediction error can be suc-
cessfully  cancelled,  the  brain—the  organ  that
constantly minimizes prediction error, according
to  predictive  coding  framework—still  tries  to
modify its model in order to decrease surprisal,
though unsuccessfully. If what I have suggested
in  the  last  section  is  correct,  the  function  of
memory systems is  to  update  knowledge  con-
tributing to the construction of predictive mod-
els in order to minimize prediction error. The
anomalous model of CD is thus one constructed
by the hierarchical simulation model to match
the  hypoactivity  of  the  AIC—the  loss  of  ap-
praisal that represents the significance of self-re-
lated  information.  To  construct  a  model  in
which oneself is dead or does not exist cannot
successfully explain away the prediction error—
since one  still  has  the experience  of  a  bodily
state—it may nevertheless be the best solution
the given system can come up with in order to
cope with the increased anxiety resulting from
increased attention. 
However, this still leaves us with the ques-
tion  of  why some  depersonalized  patients  de-
velop CD, whereas most of them do not develop
this delusion.  Gerrans (2014) suggests that the
difference  between  delusional  and  non-delu-
sional  minds  lies  in  differences  in  the  default
mode network, which include information that
triggers  activity,  hyperactivity,  and  hypercon-
nectivity, interaction with the salience system,
and  absent  or  impaired  “decontextualized  su-
pervision” (pp. 73–74). Decontextualized super-
vision allows one to “reason about oneself using
impersonal,  objective  rules  of  inference”  (p.
76).10 The activity of  its circuit  is  anti-correl-
ated with the activity of the default mode net-
work (pp. 83–84) because of the limited cognit-
ive  resources  for  high-level  metacognitive pro-
cesses.  Gerrans  suggests  that  delusional
thoughts arise from the system’s failure to bal-
ance this allocation; thus they slip through the
supervision system.
10 The system of decontextualized supervision is distinct from the se-
mantic  memory  system  discussed  in  the  last  section:  The  latter
provides objective elements for the construction of a contextualized
autobiographical episode, while the former supervises autobiograph-
ical episodes by utilizing decontextualized reasoning.
Nevertheless, the existence of decontextu-
alized  supervision  explains  how  anomalous
forms  of  predictive  models—which  would  be
suppressed  in  non-delusional  subjects—could
emerge, but it does not account for the model’s
relation to anomalous experience or to the way
in which the content of delusion is constructed
(e.g., Cotard delusion). I therefore propose that
a delusional mind does not only result from a
compromised  decontextualized  supervision;  it
also results from an aberrant precision expecta-
tion11 of exteroceptive or interoceptive signals.
Jakob Hohwy (2013) proposes the notion of un-
certainty  expectations:  We  predict  the  causal
structure of the world (and of one’s own bodily
state), as well as the level of uncertainty in the
environment, which allows us to respond to the
external environment under various levels of un-
certainty.  The  strength  of  prediction  error  is
proportional  to  the  expected  certainty:  When
the uncertainty level is  expected to be higher
(due  to  external  or  internal  noise),  the  prior
model is weighted higher, whereas expected low
uncertainty  gives  more  weight  to  bottom-up
prediction  error.  According  to  Hohwy (2013),
delusion  arises  when  precision  expectation  is
either too high or too low, and those in between
would  report  only  the  anomalous  experience,
without forming a delusion. In the case of Co-
tard delusion developed from depersonalization,
when one has the expectation of high precision,
the system tends to be driven by the bottom-up
predictive error  of  unexpected hypoactivity of
the AIC, rather than the prior model. One is,
therefore, more likely to revise the model in or-
der to explain away the surprisal resulting from
the mismatch between the actual and predicted
activation level of the AIC; that is, the systems
of patients suffering from CD are driven by an
urge to modify their top-down predictive mod-
els in order to conform to the loss of AIC activ-
ity. The construction of the model in CD is con-
sidered an attempt to minimize prediction error.
Finally, explaining delusion under the pre-
dictive coding framework provides new under-
standing to the debate between one- and two-
11 “Precision” is also used to refer to the precision of inferences about
hidden causal structures (e.g., in  Friston et al. 2013). Here and in
Hohwy (2013) it indicates the precision of incoming signals.
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stage models of delusion. The one-stage model
holds that anomalous experience only suffices to
explain  the  occurrence  of  delusion  (Gerrans
2002; Maher 1974, 1988); according to two-stage
model, however, other cognitive disruption is re-
quired to explain the content of the delusion in
particular (Young & De Pauw 2002). However,
if  the  predictive  coding  framework  is  correct,
the clear distinction between experience and ra-
tionalization assumed in the traditional discus-
sion does not exist: Perception, cognition, and
action  are  now  considered  continuous  and
highly integrated (Clark 2013b; Hohwy & Rajan
2012). Experience and rationalization are differ-
ent layers of abstraction within the very same
process of prediction error minimization under
the predictive coding framework.
5 Conclusion
In his target paper, Philip Gerrans proposes a
theory of self-awareness that integrates the pre-
dictive coding framework, the appraisal theory,
and the simulation model. It accounts for the
loss  of  self-awareness  in  DPD  and  CD,  and
provides a new understanding of patients’ anxi-
ety.  In  this  commentary,  I  have  proposed  (1)
that the simulation model should be considered
a hierarchical model involving multiple memory
systems—namely,  it  is  constituted  by  proced-
ural, semantic, and episodic memory and pro-
spection (section  2); and (2) that the function
of memory systems or simulation models, under
the predictive coding framework, is  to update
the knowledge required for successful prediction
(section  3). This implies that memory function
and malfunction are independent from the gen-
eration of a predictive model that succeeds or
fails in representing the world, since it is pos-
sible  that  misrepresentation  rather  than
veridical  representation  leads  to  a  generative
model that minimizes prediction error. Based on
such view of the simulation model, CD can be
regarded as the modification of top-down pre-
diction in an attempt to explain away the pre-
diction  error  resulting from unexpected  hypo-
activity of the AIC. I also suggested (3) that a
combination of two factors is necessary for the
occurrence  of  CD from depersonalization:  the
compromised decontextualized  supervision sys-
tem and the expectation of high precision of in-
teroceptive signals (section 4).
If both the general framework and my sug-
gestions are correct, there are a number of is-
sues worthy of further investigation: First, if the
model that explains the symptoms of CD is cre-
ated by the system in order to minimize predic-
tion error from hypoactivity of the AIC, with
the aim of affording relief from anxiety, it is ex-
pected that the change of prediction may be ac-
companied  by  minimized  prediction  error
or/and prediction error from other unpredicted
activities.  In the case of  Cotard delusion,  the
new model—the model of the organism’s death
or non-existence—would encounter new kinds of
prediction error due to information about bod-
ily states, instead of a lack of emotional signific-
ance. This may as well be the kind of prediction
error  that  cannot  be  cancelled  top-down  and
which can be expected to lead to anxiety based
on Gerrans’ theory. Therefore, the anxiety char-
acteristic of the Cotard delusion is speculated to
be the result of different prediction errors from
patients suffering from Cotard syndrome. Stud-
ies  on  the  difference  between  the  anxiety
present in DPD and that in CD can the support
or refutation of the framework proposed. Fur-
thermore,  it  is  worth  noting  that  not  all  pa-
tients with the CD suffer from anxiety. For ex-
ample, in  Berrios & Luque’s (1995) analysis of
100 cases,  anxiety is  reported in only 65% of
subjects, and patients were categorized: Cotard
type I patients showed no affective component,
whereas type II patients showed depression and
anxiety.  Can the  proposed  framework account
for both types of patients? 
Another interesting question for future re-
search is whether we can better understand the
relation between the simulation model and af-
fective processing within the predictive coding
framework, and whether an explanation of this
would be consistent with the existing evidence
relating  to  emotional  memory  (e.g.,  LaBar &
Cabeza 2006). Affective processing can influence
encoding  and  retrieval  of  memories,  whereas
simulating possible episodes is thought to help
rehearse  affective  responses.  One  possible  av-
enue might be the investigation of the influence
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of different forms of simulation on affective pro-
cessing (e.g., memory retrieval from a field or
an  observer  perspective;  Berntsen &  Rubin
2006), and further on one’s awareness of one’s
future and past (Wilson & Ross 2003): How can
this be accounted for by the principle of predic-
tion error minimization? Does the simulation of
potential affective responses optimize prediction
and reduce potential  error in the future? The
simulation  and  integration  of  future  potential
changes into the model of one’s autobiography
is thought to potentially contribute to the pre-
vention of dramatic changes in one’s model at
higher levels, and to maintain mental autobio-
graphies that are more consistent across time.
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